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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

April 29, 1963

PLACE: Admiralty House

TIME: 12 noon until 2:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS: U.K.

Harold D. MacMILLAN, Prime Minister
Sir Edward HEATH, Lord Privy Seal


U.S.

W. Averell HARRISMAN, Under Secretary of State

I filled in the Prime Minister on all aspects of my talks with Khrushchev and a bit of Gromyko.

On Laos, I underlined the need for the British Ambassador to function in Laos as the representative of the Co-Chairman as well as Home's responsibility with Gromyko.

Despite the reaffirmation publicly by Khrushchev of support for the Geneva Accords and the Vienna understanding, I expressed doubt as to how much Khrushchev could or would influence the Pathet Lao or the Viet Minh's actions in Laos.



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BY mgm NARS, DATE 6/20/84




Khrushchev

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
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The Prime Minister



The Prime Minister asked about Khrushchev's health and position. I explained he seemed much older, less bouncy and looked tired, but gave no indication of worry over his personal position of control. I felt he was worried about his row with Peiping -- I guessed the Party machine was upset by the turn of events among Communist parties in third countries with Peiping making progress at Moscow's expense. Moscow had had a series of setbacks -- Cuba, Iraq, 
, Congo, Guinea, Mali, embarrassment over India-China; the question of poor results of Malinovsky's visit to Indonesia. 

Also, the ChiComs were using with some effect the racial line.




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
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I explained my discussion with Khrushchev over Cuba, underlining its importance to the President. The Prime Minister



I took the occasion to explain in some detail the political problem that Cuba presented to the President.

We then went on to the test ban. I read from my memorandum of conversation with Khrushchev.



I declined to guess but stuck to Khrushchev's words. I


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
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suggested that I might have found out more if I had had a weekend lunch with Khrushchev (this was made impossible by Castro's arrival). He understood this from his own experience. He felt the loss of intimate relations of our old Ambassadors (Thompson and Roberts)



I underlined the importance we placed on improved U.K.-German relations.

I mentioned Wilson's speech to the Press Club --



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[REDACTED] I agreed recalling the Prime Minister's talk with me two years ago. Heath said

[REDACTED]

The Prime Minister was very cordial and expressed thanks for the very full and frank discussion of my Khrushchev talks and the Soviet position generally.

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